



Limits of the ‘social pact’ in Brazil 
 






The present article analyzes the June 2013 demonstrations that took place in many cities in Brazil, 
arguing that ultimately they expose the limits of the ‘social pact’ promoted by Lula since his 2002 
presidential campaign. Problems and contradictions in different spheres of the Brazilian society are 
brought into light to argue that the ‘social pact’ has reached its limits and that structural changes are 
needed if it is to deepen social justice and economic growth. The recent protests and informal online 
organized mobilizations pose new challenges not only to the Federal Government, but to political 










Back in 2002, when Lula was elected President in his fourth attempt, he did so by 
presenting his candidacy with a moderate government platform, based on the now famous ‘Letter to 
the Brazilian People’ (a document that actually contained clear messages to reassure the financial 
markets that there would be no economic rupture). At that time, it was no wonder he was referred 
to in the press as ‘Lula light’, ‘Little Lula peace and love’ and the Worker’s Party (PT), as ‘Pink PT', 
in opposition to the more red, radical leftist discourse presented in the previous three elections. 
Dancing according to the music set by his sharp marketing advisor, Duda Mendonça, Lula made use 
of one of his most memorable catchphrases in that election: only he would be able to perform a true 
‘social pact’ that would put an end to Brazil's critical socioeconomic situation experienced at the end 
of the second term of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration (Party of Brazilian Social 
Democracy, PSDB). The idea, 'hope overcame fear'1, caught on and Lula finally won the Presidency. 
The concrete expression that would give a ‘face’ to the symbolic driving idea of Lula’s social 
pact was the creation of the Council for Economic and Social Development (CDES), composed of 
nationalist businessmen who supported Lula (dissatisfied with economic liberalization promoted by 
previous administrations), various NGOs and social movements, trade union centers, student 
organizations; the Church through the Brazilian Conference of Bishops (CNBB); major construction 
companies like Odebrecht; the São Paulo State Industrial Federation (FIESP), among many others. 
The social pact then began to have a name and address. 
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For approximately ten years, three different governments led by the PT-PMDB (Party of the 
Brazilian Democratic Movement) alliance fulfilled the complex promise of pleasing both Greeks and 
Trojans: while about 40 million people were lifted out of extreme poverty, the financial system hit 
record profitability. While unemployment remains relatively low at around 5%-6% (even in times of 
global crisis), the landowner agribusiness has been strengthened as a key pillar of an extractive 
economy based on exports of low value-added commodities.  
At the same time that it has created an important political appreciation of the real minimum 
wage, large infrastructure projects have provoked strong environmental and social damage. While 
thousands of young people aged between 18 and 24 years managed to enter the formal labor market, 
94% of their jobs pay ‘only’ up to 1,000 Reais per month (Braga, 2013). When pressed by the 
global crisis in 2009, the Government exempted companies from the Industrial Production Tax 
(IPI), absorbing the cost and stimulating the domestic consumption market. The illustrations for 
this ambiguous socioeconomic context could follow almost endlessly. The policy of the social pact 
sought to reconcile the irreconcilable - and for quite some time it did so successfully. 
Especially during Lula's two terms a huge effort was made to bring the diversity of society 
‘into’ the government, to democratize the decision-making processes, particularly through the 
creation of National Councils and Thematic Conferences, which institutionalized channels of 
participation in public policy formulation. ‘Between 2003 and 2010, 74 national conferences were 
held, and out of these, 21 occurred once, nine had two editions, five had three editions, and five 
others had four editions. We had 74 conferences with 74 different themes. (…) We can say that 
during the Lula government, there was a lot of 'experimenting'. Different themes were put forward 
to be debated by society as whole, and this was positive because it mobilized various sectors of 
society to reflect on national issues’ (Teixeira et al., 2012). 
It should be emphasized, however, that participation in these areas mainly involved 
organized civil society, including youth groups not only from the student movement, but a 
multiplicity of groups, out of which some were more and some were less institutionalized. In this 
sense, nowadays there is a challenge posed to the ways through which political participation was 
originally channeled by the Lula government. This is so because, as pointed out by Romão (2013), 
there is a whole non-institutionalized (often individual) and virtual dimension (that occurs via the 
Internet) that must somehow be taken into account by the official structures of the political system. 
Of course, this is not just a challenge for democracy in Brazil. Researchers at the Institute 
for the Future (itft.org), in San Francisco (USA), have been working on developing a mobile app to 
enable the direct participation of citizens in official politics. The idea is that the app will allow 
citizens to have transparent access to all the votes of Congressmen and that they will be able to 
interact with comments or participate in surveys about how the politician should vote on a 
particular matter or policy decision. There is a democratizing potential in the interface between 
politics and social networks around the world that we have barely begun to explore and, perhaps, we 
are underestimating. 
Even taking into account the advances and limitations of the participation model practiced 
in the country, it can be said – at the risk of a slight exaggeration – that at least from 2003 to 2010 
Brazil has lived under this kind of general tacit approval of the current model. Brazil changed its 
image and projection on the international stage, becoming much more active and respected than it 
was ever before (at the same time that it has taken a larger distance to the US influence on foreign 
policy). Over recent years, the image of the country as the 5th largest economy in the world has 
been complemented with that of a great ‘peaceful’ democracy where poverty reduction has indeed 
been achieved.  
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An important exception to this favorable context was the issue of corruption. This came to 
occupy a space in the media’s political debate, especially after the 2005 ‘Mensalão’ episode in which 
Lula’s government officials were accused of paying a monthly allowance (mensalão) to Congressmen, 
in order to get enough votes to pass bills and approve progressive policies. That scandal was revealed 
in retaliation for an investigation of the Postal Service which had exposed other party’s corruption 
schemes.  
Despite that, the current political model of a Federal Government that has effective social 
policies which improve the lives of the poor, and at the same time does not cause extreme disruption 
to the elite’s interests seemed to please the majority of Brazilian society. This is even more the case 
in the present context of more radicalized leftist political experiences going on in several Latin 
American countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, which traditionally tend to inspire fear 
and aversion in the Brazilian middle and upper classes. 
In 2010, relying on broad social approval of Lula’s two terms, Dilma Rousseff's election was 
marked by the symbolic construction of her image as one of a ‘competent manager’, who had been 
Minister of Mines and Energy and the Presidency Chief of Staff. Dilma, ‘the big efficient manager’, 
would be the right person to keep the country on the path of social transformation without the 
‘charismatic deviations’ attributed to Lula, improving the performance of public administration and 
favoring the so-called ‘friendly environment for investment’. Roughly speaking, that was what she 
tried to do in her first two years in office, even though the external environment of financial crisis 
has made it difficult to obtain significant results.2 
Nobody predicted that in June 2013 large street demonstrations would erupt across Brazil. 
However, today it is possible to note that before it happened many smaller tensions were already 
setting the scene: while in March 2013 polls showed a wide approval of Dilma’s government (79%)3 
– meaning that the president had a higher chance to win in the 2014 elections first round – many 
other conflicts, grievances, struggles, demands and aspirations were being settled and were pulsating 
with increasing force in several cities (Vainer, 2013). A relatively widespread discontent regarding 
the President’s distancing and social insensitivity was growing even among the leftist traditional 
forces and government allies (Sousa Santos, 2013). 
Some of the issues expressed during these conflicts can be interpreted as consequences of the 
recent acceleration in the development of Brazilian capitalism – following the always fertile 
analytical line of Francisco de Oliveira (2013) – and the deep changes that this acceleration is 
causing to the social tissue. New territorialities are rapidly being created in Brazil’s largest cities, 
responding mainly to economic interests that privatize the space in favor of the flow of goods and 
capital. The impact of these movements on the territory can be seen in the demonstrations and riots 
that were pre-marking the context for the June protests, such as the construction of the Belo Monte 
hydroelectric plant on the Xingu River, the Jirau plant on the Madeira River and Suape 
Thermoelectric in Pernambuco state. 
Add in to the scene conflicts between mining and agribusiness sectors with the Indians in the 
Amazon (among which the case of suicides committed by members of Guaraní-Kaiowá tribes have 
gained much media attention); the extreme violence of the Military Police (MP) of São Paulo in the 
expropriation of the Pinheirinho community in the nearby city of São José dos Campos, belonging to 
corrupt speculator Naji Nahas; the ‘pacification by force’ in strategic areas of slums in Rio de Janeiro 
and other cities in preparation for the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games; among other 
conflicts, and you have a thick – yet sort of invisible – broth of discontent underlying Brazilian 
society. Even in terms of the traditional labor unions, often accused of apathy, a strong increase in 
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the number of strikes have been observed throughout the country since the year 2008 (Braga, 2013) 
and continued throughout 2013. 
 Many more diffuse and invisible elements enhance the sense of social unrest. These 
included: recurrent cases of rapes of women in vans in Rio de Janeiro (divulged by the national press 
only after one of the victims was a foreign tourist); the spread of the use of crack in the big cities; gay 
community protests against evangelical preacher Feliciano as president of the Lower House 
Commission on Human Rights, because of his madly proposed ‘gay cure’ bill; discussions about 
reducing the age of criminal persecution…etc. 
In early 2013, when new soccer stadiums began to be inaugurated before the FIFA 
Confederations Cup, no one was really surprised to see them as the target of demonstrations against 
the spending of public money in the organization of the World Cup. An event that in 2007 had been 
promised by Lula as ‘the World Cup sponsored by the private initiative’, but which effectively has 
proven to be ‘the World Cup to the private profit’. The relatively invisible work of the National 
Coordination of Popular Committees for the World Cup and Olympics (ANCOP) played an 
important role in raising awareness and mobilizing communities affected by these mega-events 
(Vainer, 2013). The extremely violent action of the Military Police (MP) against indigenous 
communities on vacating the Indigenous People’s Museum, located next to the Maracanã Stadium 
in Rio, is just one example among many.  
Already in the very first game played between Brazilian soccer teams in new stadiums, the 
old violence that permeates Brazilian soccer fans in their clash with each other or with the Military 
Police, quickly emerged. In the brand-new ‘Arenas’ paid with public funds, the audience of the show 
is still treated like cattle and still reacts like hooligans. 
In the ‘chapter apart’ regarding corruption, the year 2012 was marked by a spectacular 
overexposure of the mensalão trial in the major media, of which the climax coincided masterfully 
with the holding of municipal elections in October. Never before – and never after, the Federal 
Supreme Court (STF) had as much media attention as highlighted in this episode, taking the Court 
Ministers to the status of true pop stars. They were converted into heroes and antiheroes of a sort of 
novel, TV series, like a Big Brother show broadcasted 24 hours a day in the news channels.  
When the politicians judged guilty at first instance were not placed immediately behind bars 
– since legally the process was still open – many ‘fans’ of this or that judge became angry with the 
anticlimax of Criminal Case 470 (the official name for the mensalão trial). As has occurred since 
2005, the so called mensalão appeared as a major issue in the social networks, plus other events such 
as the Parliamentary Inquiring Commission (CPI) about the Cachoeira case4 (ended in nothing); 
protests against the election of Renan Calheiros (PMDB) for the Presidency of the Senate;5 and the 
underground transportation system mafia during the PSDB administrations in São Paulo state. 
Social networks then largely channeled this general indignation, both to the right and to the left. 
The fact that in the 2012 municipal elections the Worker’s Party (PT) suffered no loss of 
power even under the heavy media bombardment around the mensalão trial but, instead, went on to 
govern the largest city in the country, certainly contributed to a greater frustration for groups such 
as Cansei!,6 Endireita Brasil,7 and certain intellectuals gathered in policy centers such as the 
Millennium Institute and the Garças House.8 Important to note, these social groups were also on the 
streets in June, many of them singing the national anthem and chanting the chorus of ‘Dilma out of 
office!’. 
The mobilization trigger of the June demonstrations, the Free Pass Movement (MPL), dates 
back to the coordination processes before and during the World Social Forum (WSF), the struggles 
against economic liberalization and specifically back to the year 2005, when in the cities of Salvador 
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(the Buzu revolt) and Florianópolis, strong protests took place against the increase in the bus fare 
and for the free pass (Romão, op. cit.). Several other MPL demonstrations occurred before 2013, 
without, however, appearing in the mainstream media and lacking capacity to expand and involve 
other social sectors. 
Since June much analysis and discussion has been produced about the demonstrations in 
Brazil. It is important to recognize that one of the consequences of the demonstrations is that there 
has been an increase of public debate, breaking up a certain lethargic feeling. Whether it was in the 
universities, social movements, political parties, social networks, the press, informal bar 
discussions... all these areas were ‘caught by surprise’ by the events since June. There is now a revival 
of the debate on the direction Brazil is heading. This is positive. 
We know from these various reflections that a major element in question is the performance 
of the Brazilian police. It was due to the excessive police crackdown on the Free Pass Movement 
demonstrations that demands for the reduction in the transport fee gained the sympathy of a larger 
part of the population. After severely injuring journalists of large media groups who were on duty 
covering the protests, public opinion moved against repression and tens of thousands took to the 
streets. The result was an embarrassing shift in the mainstream media discourse about the 
demonstrations.  
The fundamental problem that this episode brought up was the brutal reality of police 
repression that constantly runs through Brazilian peripheries and the decay of the prison system. 
Already before, but especially after the wave of attacks by the PCC in 2006,9 the order for the MPs, 
ROTAs, BOPEs10 and alike is to shoot first and ask questions later. There are plenty of invisible 
‘Amarildos’ and ‘Douglas’11 – innocent people killed daily in police actions.  
According to Vieira (2013), ‘data on violence in Brazil in these two last decades are 
alarming. Officially more than 900,000 people were victims of murder between 1990 and 2011. If 
we add about 130 thousand deaths not counted as detected by the IPEA12 research, more than 1 
million people were victims of homicide in our own everyday war. Such a figure is much higher than 
the American casualties in the Vietnam War or even the deaths in the Gulf War, or the 
Israel/Palestine conflict, which has lasted more than six decades’. Even the various complaints 
against Brazil at the United Nations Human Rights Council are unable and powerless to push for 
real change in this sad situation. 
In such a context, the public security forces and prison system are some of the public 
institutions that have been on the margin of the ‘virtuous cycle’ of the last ten years: they continue 
with a military culture inherited from the dictatorship; they are still underpaid; operating in 
outdated facilities; highly bureaucratized; and continue operating with an essentially repressive bias 
that systematically violates the human rights of citizens, particularly the poor and the black. 
Violence is trivialized in the country. It became a daily experience and its very root, social inequality 
(not just economic), remains a deep problem of Brazilian society (Caccia Bava, 2013), even though 
it has recently mitigated extreme poverty. ‘After 20 years of democracy, this Brazil intended 
protagonist of the great international scene has a duty to radically rethink its political culture of 
public security and to modify the perception today widely disseminated that the police is nothing 
more than the concrete expression of the general oppression of the State over its citizens’ (Berrón, 
2013). 
 The police are today among the institutions that have the lowest level of confidence from 
the population. Data from a recent survey developed by the School of Law at FGV13 indicates that 
77% of the population earning less than two times the minimum wage (R$ 1,356.00 in 2013 
values)14 do not trust the police. Among the population with income levels between two and ten 
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times the minimum wage, the level of distrust varies between 65% and 63%. This disbelief reaches 
59% of the population with an income of above 10 times the minimum wage. That means that the 
lower the income, the greater the mistrust of the police. Other important institutions of the 
Brazilian democracy thicken the chorus of distrust: the Judiciary system, with 42% of public 
confidence; the Federal Government, 40%; TV stations, with 33% confidence; neighbors, 30%; 
Congress, 22%; and national Political Parties in general with a measly 5% of confidence. 
‘It’s not for 20 cents’. If the excessive repression by the police was perhaps the greatest catalyst 
element that turned various other groups and causes to be in solidarity with the Free Pass 
Movement, the qualitative leap of the demonstrations has been summarized in the slogan ‘it’s not for 
20 cents’.  
When the demonstrations to block the bus fare increase by 0,20 Reais reached sufficient size 
and power to stop our cities, it then opened the possibility of establishing a deeper debate about 
urban mobility and the development model. The MPL accepted the challenge and faced debates in 
the media and with the public authorities stressing that the issue was beyond the 20 cents raise. 
Other dimensions of the community life were addressed, such as the urban mobility model, the 
power of the private mass transport companies, the issue of corporate financing for politicians, the 
brutal and undemocratic police repression, the privatization of public spaces, etc. 
In the ‘country of all’,15 a significant part of society expressed (both to the right and to the 
left) that it does not intend to take part in the current political project. This will not change simply 
because the bus fare raise was canceled due to the street protests. Following the analytical line 
proposed by French philosopher Jacques Rancière (1996), the protests that emerged in June have 
created an authentic moment of political misunderstanding, a moment of political dissent within the 
Brazilian society. This moment of misunderstanding means that the political conflict between 
society and the public authorities has surpassed the mere economic demands and went ahead as a 
broader and deeper questioning about the direction and values of our own common social life, our 
own lifestyle. At that very moment the endurance of the past ten years’ social pact initiated by Lula 
in the 2002 elections came into question. 
It came into question because the population now demands more than what has been 
achieved so far. The State and public institutions are being called to be more present and more 
efficient, providing more and better public services (we should note here that these type of demands 
for a greater role of the State are far away from neoliberal policy solutions). Citizens want to see 
their Constitutional rights really respected in day to day life. Demonstrations have exposed quite 
clearly that many of the country’s historical structural problems remain unresolved. To overcome 
them you need to defy strong political and economic interests, deeply rooted in both the public and 
the private sectors. And therein lies the real challenge. 
As often occurs during protests, the streets were taken largely by the youth. As it also often 
happens, they were quickly called by the mainstream media as ‘rebels without a cause’, ‘unemployed 
students’ or simply ‘thugs, hooligans’. In the case of the June demonstrations, however, a new element 
entered the scene, namely, the fact that the protesters were not - mostly - linked to the traditional 
political organizations such as the student movement, the labor movement, organized social 
movements, or partisan youths. The political forces, in the institutional left themselves, were very 
slow to understand what was going on and recognize the relevance of the mobilizations. 
Some of the main characteristics of the protests were the absence of party flags, sound-
equipped trucks or elder leaders speaking to the crowd from a higher platform; and opposition to 
political parties and institutions. Instead, creative joking slogans and chants written in hand-made 
individual paper posters like ‘we’ve got out of Facebook’,16 ‘sorry for the inconvenience, we are changing 
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the country’, or even ‘oh, but what a shame, the bus fare is more expensive than marijuana!’ highlighted a 
further distinction of political culture with relation to the practices of the traditional left (and also 
to the traditional right itself). It is not our purpose in this paper to judge whether the 
demonstrations that began in June were more or less politicized than others, for each context has its 
own peculiarities and all forms of conflict are significant in themselves. 
Following this analytical path proposed by Rancière, we observe a process in which 
individuals who appear in the political scene are always directly linked to the historical dimension of 
their life experience and through the conflict itself. They put forward political visions that were not 
recognized by the current status quo. These various forms of public performance of conflicts are 
referred to by Rancière as a variety of forms of political subjectivation.17 
 
By forms of subjectivation we understand the production of acts, a forum and a capacity of 
enunciation that were not identifiable in a given field of experience, whose identification 
thus goes hand in hand with the reconfiguration of life experience (Rancière, 1996:47-48). 
 
Since June, a big gap in the forms of political subjectivation of those involved in the 
institutional political field and those who are not (and maybe not even want to be in) became 
apparent in the public arena, causing a misunderstanding of major proportions, which reshaped the 
current field of Brazilian political experience. The difficulty of mayors, governors and the federal 
government in dealing with the situation, calling for police repression in response to democratic 
demands, is just a symptom of this mismatch. Another difficulty was encountered by the 
institutionalized civil society in the form of social movements, trade unions and NGOs attempting 
to have dialogue with non-institutional groups and forms of doing politics, which sometimes 
resulted in physical confrontation in the streets. 
Sometimes differences in forms of subjectivation correspond to different generational 
experiences, especially when the historical context presents major changes. Perhaps it is not 
unreasonable to propose the hypothesis that the June demonstrations in Brazil put into play certain 
generation born in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These are largely people who did not experience 
many of the Brazilian major political events in recent history: the Military Dictatorship period or 
the Cold War; the ‘Direct Elections Now!’ movement for democracy; the ‘Painted Faces’ youth 
movement during former president Collor's impeachment; or even Lula’s three defeats to the 
Presidency.  
It is largely a generation born in a world with Internet and mobile phones, with a globalized 
financial capitalism, and with the war on terror. Finally, it is a generation that matured politically 
while the PT is in power, but being accused of corruption as any other party, which reinforces the 
perception that they are all ‘tarred with the same brush’, away from the ordinary people and 
concerned only with their business supporters (Brum, 2013). 
President Dilma Rousseff, who in fact had the responsibility to give a political response to 
the protests beyond the tariff reduction promoted by local governors, reacted in an interesting way. 
She proposed far-reaching measures, some of which, such as the allocation of royalties from the pre-
salt oil fields for Education and Health Care, and the ‘More Doctors’ program18 were successfully 
adopted in Congress. Others, like the Constituent Referendum for a Political Reform, have been 
captured by procedural maneuvers in Congress and almost did not get featured in major media, a 
sign showing the heavy gambling interests that this proposal threatened.19 
While the President was responding with a proposal for political reform that touched on 
many of the major problems expressed in the demonstrations – among them the crucial issue of 
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public financing for political campaigns, closely linked to corruption schemes – there was almost no 
connection between the streets and the Presidency, between institutional and non-institutional 
fields. About this specific point, the interpretation of Garcia dos Santos (2013) is precise: 
 
Dilma gave a political response that was absolutely crucial because it answered to a demand 
for more power from the movements in the streets, with something that broadened social 
participation in power. It was interesting, very enlightening, because doing such a proposal, 
the conservatives and the whole political class mobilized to boycott it, firstly turning it into 
a referendum so that nothing would happen. These sectors were playing their expected role, 
but the ones were not playing their role were the demonstrators who had called for more 
power and, when you have the ultimate authority of the State waving and saying, ‘Come on’, 
the other side did not respond. There were no demonstrations in favor of these proposals, or 
an understanding of the significance of that political gesture. Sectors in the right immediately 
knew how to read what was at stake, and the protesters did not. 
  
As pointed out by Ortellado (2013), the events that took place from June on showed an 
experimental quest for both concrete results and an intense practice of autonomous political 
processes guided by direct democracy and horizontality principles. With regard to results, ‘in the 
final moments of the campaign against the bus fee increase, the fight was stormed by the 
broadcasting media conservative agenda. When the fee increase was reversed, the agitation remained 
orphaned and the dispersion of demands took over the process’. 
From this point on, several sparse and fragmented demonstrations have taken over the 
streets and the political scene. Black bloc groups have joined the demonstrations and started to gain 
prominence in the mainstream press, which traditionally uses the issue of strategic violence and 
anonymity of these groups to take the focus off the real issues that mobilize the protests. It has been 
so for a long time, in Brazil and abroad. Also, after the reversion of the tariff increase, mobilizations 
began to occur mainly in the suburbs and road blockages became more frequent. The police started 
to strongly crack down on the demonstrations again, bringing the debate on police violence back to 
the scene. 
Perhaps it is possible to say, following the analytical line opened by Garcia dos Santos, that 
the June movements may have kept the ‘small’ victorious outcome (reversion of the increase in bus 
and subway fees) but they missed the opportunity to conquer the greater result that was within 
reach: political reform. Still, there are undoubtedly important legacies from the June, July, August, 
September... protests. Important political processes of direct democracy and anti-capitalism were 
renewed; new actors who were not tied to traditional political forces on the left appeared on the 
public scene; an interesting field of reflection on the political and social networks has been opened; 
the debate about the police action became visible again; the Brazilian development model and our 
democratic life itself were questioned on their very structural contradictions. 
The limits of the 2002 ‘social pact’ are now exposed for everyone to see. It is difficult to say 
to what extent the institutional political field will be able to reconcile with the demands and 
practices from the streets. It will be a challenge that involves not only government and political 
parties, but also the labor movement, whose relation with non-institutional youth groups should be 
revised. Looking up to an important year, 2014, that will host Presidential elections and the FIFA 
World Cup, the fact is that the direction that the Brazilian society will decide to follow in the near 












1. Another famous catchphrase used by Lula during the 2002 Presidential campaign. 
 
2. Brazilian recent GDP has been of 7,5% (2010); 2,7% (2011); 0,9% (2012); and 2,3% (2013). 
Source: Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE). 
 
3.  Source: IBOPE Institute / National Confederation of Industry. 
 
4.  Famous lawbreaker who has links with many politicians in illegal business and money evasion 
schemes. 
 
5.  Calheiros is involved in various corruption scandals, however has never been claimed guilty. 
 
6. Cansei! Movement (I’m tired!) was created in 2006 by some of Brazilian famous artists, actors, 
sportsman, intellectuals and politicians. Its objective is to promote a debate on the lack of ethics in 
politics, targeting the Worker’s Party Administration in particular. 
 
7. Endireita Brasil Movement is an elitist right wing movement that advocates for the emergence of 
a ‘new right’ in Brazil. Its core principles are: 1. Individual liberties over Collective interest. 2. Free 
initiative and Free market. 3. Respect to the law, contracts and private property. 4. Limited Government. 5. 
Solid moral and ethical values. 6. Democratic State ideals and principles. 
 
8. The Millennium Institute and the Garças House are two Brazilian right wing think-tanks. 
 
9. PCC – First Command of the Capital is the name of a widespread organized crime faction 
involving criminals operating from within various prisons and orchestrating attacks against police 
stations, particularly in the city of São Paulo. 
 
10. Names of police elite groups in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. 
 
11. Amarildo, a construction worker, and Douglas, a little boy, are two innocent people that were 
assassinated by the police during actions in the slums of Rio and São Paulo in the second semester of 
2013. 
 
12. IPEA – Institute for Applied Economic Research, a Federal body. 
 
13. FGV – Getúlio Vargas Foundation, a private university. 
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14. Around 574 US Dollars, as of Jan/2014. 
 
15. Slogan used in the Government’s propaganda pieces under Lula’s administration. 
 
16. In Brazil, the June demonstrations were the first of its kind to succeed in mass mobilizing 
through Facebook networking. 
 
17. ‘Forms of political subjectivation’ are the processes though which people emerge from their 
common sense social positions of daily life to play active roles in the political scene. E.g. A woman, 
through her political subjectivation process, might become a feminist activist; or a regular worker, 
might become a trade union leader. 
 
18. The ‘More Doctors’ program allowed foreign doctors to legally work in Brazil, receiving wages 
from the Government, especially in distant areas of the country or in places with lack of doctors in 
big cities’ peripheries.  
 
19. It’s relevant to note that the PT is one of the few parties that advocates exclusive public 
financing of election campaigns, together with some small radical leftist ones. Conservative forces 
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